Constitutional Law—Obscenity: A Return to the First Amendment? \u3ci\u3eStanley v. Georgia\u3c/i\u3e, 394 U.S. 557 (1969) by Snowden, John R.
Nebraska Law Review
Volume 49 | Issue 3 Article 8
1970
Constitutional Law—Obscenity: A Return to the
First Amendment? Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557
(1969)
John R. Snowden
University of Nebraska College of Law, jsnowden1@unl.edu
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/nlr
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law, College of at DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Nebraska Law Review by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln.
Recommended Citation




CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-OBSCENITY: A RETURN TO THE
FIRST AMENDMENT? Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U. S. 557 (1969).
I. INTRODUCTION
The narrow holding of Stanley v. Georgia' is simply that: "[T]he
First and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit making mere private
possession of obscene material a crime."' 2 However, as at least one
federal district court has recognized: "It is impossible ... to ignore
the broader implications of the opinion which appears to reject
or at least modify the proposition stated in Roth v. United States,
354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957) that 'obscenity is not within the area of
constitutionally protected speech or press.' "13This note will examine
these "broader implications" and consider the constitutionality of
state repression of obscenity in light of the opinion in Stanley.4
Under authority of a search warrant issued by a United States
Commissioner, state and federal officers entered the defendant's
house in Atlanta, Georgia. The warrant described with particularity
the place to be searched, which was Stanley's home, and the things
to be seized, book-making materials. While looking through a desk
drawer the officers found three reels of eight-millimeter film.5 Using
a projector and screen found in an upstairs bedroom, the agents
spent some fifty minutes exhibiting the films. The state officer con-
cluded that the fims were obscene, and after determining that
Stanley occupied the bedroom, arrested Stanley and charged him
with possession of obscene matter. He was indicted for "knowingly
hav[ing] possession of . .. obscene matter" in violation of Georgia
1 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
2 Id. at 568.
3 Stein v. Batchelor, 300 F. Supp. 602, 606 (N.D. Tex. 1969).
4 It is interesting to note that there need not have been any obscenity
question. As the dissenting opinion points out, there was an obvious
fourth amendment infringement. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. at
569-72. However, the dissenters do not object to the rationale of the
majority. Peripherally, the Court may also have been concerned with
strengthening its privacy decisions. Cf. Alderman v. United States,
394 U.S. 165 (1969) (holding that a homeowner has standing to object
to an unlawful surveillance of conversations taking place in his home
although he was not a conversant); The Supreme Court, 1968 Term,
83 HARV. L. REV. 147, 151 (1969).
5 It should be assumed that the films were prepared by someone other
than Stanley and either given or sold to him.
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law.6 Stanley was tried before a jury and convicted, and the Su-
preme Court of Georgia affirmed his conviction.7 The defendant
then appealed to the United States Supreme Court.
It is important to note that the defendant made no argument
that the films involved were not obscene; and the Court assumed
that they were obscene under any of the tests of the members of
the Court.8 Therefore, the issue of the constitutionality of the Geor-
gia obscenity statute was clearly presented.
II. THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND GOVERNMENTAL POWER
TO REPRESS SPEECH
Although no constitutional right is absolute, as a general rule
those guaranteed under the first amendment are preferred.9 Any
governmental interest in repression of speech, therefore, requires
a clear showing that the government has a legitimate and com-
pelling interest before the shelter of the first amendment gives
way.'
0
Such a compelling governmental interest has traditionally been
recognized in suppression of profane, libelous, insulting, and "fight-
ing words."" These classes of speech by their very nature provide
a clear and present danger of harm since they are "inseparably
locked with action."'1 2 In Dennis v. United States 3 the court held
8 "Any person who shall knowingly bring or cause to be brought into
this State for sale or exhibition, or who shall knowingly sell or offer
to sell, or who shall knowingly lend or give away or offer to lend or
give away, or who shall knowingly have possession of, or who shall
knowingly exhibit or transmit to another, any obscene matter, or who
shall knowingly advertise for sale by any form of notice, printed,
written, or verbal, any obscene matter, or who shall knowingly manu-
facture, draw, duplicate or print any obscene matter with intent to
sell, expose or circulate the same, shall, if such person has knowledge
or reasonably should know of the obscene nature of such matter, be
guilty of a felony, and, upon conviction thereof, shall be punished by
confinement in the penitentiary for not less than one year nor more
than five years: Provided, however, in the event the jury so recom-
mends, such person may be punished as for a misdemeanor. As used
herein, a matter is obscene if, considered as a whole, applying con-
temporary community standards, its predominant appeal is to prurient
interest, i.e., a shameful or morbid interest in nudity, sex or excretion."
GA. CODE ANN. § 26-6301 (Supp. 1968).
7 Stanley v. State, 224 Ga. 259, 161 S.E.2d 309 (1968).
8 Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. at 559 n.2.
9 Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965).
10 Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 505-08 (1951).
11 Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942).
12 Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE
L.J. 877, 932 (1963).
13 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
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that the first amendment is not controlled by legislative determina-
tion of resulting harm.14 Consequently, the general principle is
established that speech may be suppressed only upon a judicial
determination that there is a clear and present danger of the speech
resulting in conduct which may be legitimately prohibited by the
government.
Until 1968 the Court did not attempt to reconcile this general
principle with governmental suppression of obscenity. Instead,
obscenity cases were decided by defining what was obscene and,
as in Roth v. United States,15 once the elusive concept was defined,
the purpose of the legislation involved was apparently not relevant.
There were those who questioned whether such a procedure
of deciding by definition could be reconciled with the first amend-
ment. When Roth was in the court of appeals16 Judge Frank noticed
the lack of evidence that obscenity caused antisocial conduct. Mr.
Justice Douglas, dissenting in Roth, also doubted the analysis: "By
these standards punishment is inflicted for thoughts provoked, not
for overt acts nor antisocial conduct. This test cannot be squared
with our decisions under the First Amendment."' 7
Nevertheless, the Court reasoned that obscenity was unprotected
by the first amendment not because it was harmful, but because
it was worthless: "[I]mplicit in the history of the First Amendment
is the rejection of obscenity as utterly without redeeming social
importance.'. 8 Although Roth supplied an apparently liberal defini-
tion of obscenity, the Court seemed destined to continue deciding
by definition rather than attempting to fit obscenity within any gen-
eral principle of the first amendment. 9
In 1968, Ginsberg v. New York2 0 began the process of reconciling
the first amendment and obscenity when it held that New York was
constitutionally allowed to impose a more restrictive standard as
to the sex material minors could read and see. The law was upheld
on the basis of New York's right to legislate in the interests of
14 Id. at 505-08.
15 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
16 237 F.2d 796, 801-27 (2d Cir. 1956).
17 Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. at 509. But see United States v. KIaw,
350 F.2d 155, 163 (2d Cir. 1964): "We do not doubt that 'obscenity'
may be regulated because it is thought to incite antisocial sexual
behavior and crime."
18 Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. at 484.
19 Monaghan, Obscenity, 1966: The Marriage of Obscenity Per Se and
Obscenity Per Quod, 76 YALE L.J. 127, 128-35 (1966).
20 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
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parents and the state's independent interest in the welfare of its
children, rather than by defining the materials involved as obscene.2
Apparently there was a judicial determination of a clear and
present danger which may result in harm to a legitimate govern-
mental interest. Nevertheless, the Court did not appear ready to
begin an all out effort to reconcile repression of obscenity and the
first amendment: "But obscenity is not protected expression and
may be suppressed without a showing of the circumstances which
lie behind the phrase 'clear and present danger' in its application to
protected speech.
'22
IIL. THE OLD ARGUIENTS AND THE STANLEY RATIONALE
In Stanley, the obscenity of the films was not questioned. The
Court was consequently faced directly with the issue of whether
the first and fourteenth amendments prohibit the application of
criminal sanctions to mere private possession of obscene material.
The majority answered the immediate issue affirmatively,23 but
more importantly, indicated an attempt to reconcile obscenity and
the general principle of the first amendment. An analysis of the
Stanley rationale beyond its narrow holding2 must consider the
governmental interests which states have historically and tradi-
tionally asserted (as did Georgia) to justify the repression of
obscenity.2 Each ground will be set out below, followed by an
examination of its validity in light of the opinion in Stanley.
21 Id. at 637-43.
22 Id. at 641.
23 There are few prosecutions for private possession bf obscene material
in Nebraska, and both case and statute law seem harmonious with the
narrow Stanley holding. See State v. Jungclaus, 176 Neb. 641, 126
N.W.2d 858 (1964); NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 28-920 to -926.08 (Reissue 1964);
NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 28-926.09, -926.10 (Supp. 1967); INCOLa, NEB. CoDE
§§ 9.52.130 to .52.140 (1958); OMAHA, NEB. CoDE §§ 25.69.01 to .69.02
(1967).
24 Several prior cases discussed the narrow problem of private possession
of obscene matter which was the seed of Stanley. See In re Klor,
64 Cal. 2d 816, 415 P.2d 791, 51 Cal. Rptr. 903 (1966) (criminal sanc-
tion cannot reach mere preparation of obscene material); People v.
Samuels, 250 Cal. App. 2d 501, 58 Cal. Rptr. 439 (1967) (knowing
private use of obscene material not constitutionally punishable);
State v. Mapp, 170 Ohio St. 427, 166 N.W.2d 387 (1960), rev'd on other
grounds, 367 U.S. 643, 673 (1961).
25 See, e.g., Emerson, note 12 supra; Monaghan, note 18 supra; Morreale,
Obscenity: An Analysis and Statutory Proposal, 1969 Wis. L. REV. 421
(1969); Rogge, The High Court of Obscenity, 41 CoLo. L. REV. 1, 201
(1969); Comment, Obscenity Control: A Search for Validity, 4 LAND &
WATEIR L. REv. 575 (1969). The writer of this note particularly recom-
mends Mr. Morreale's article, and would suggest that if the Court is to
stand behind Stanley it should, when the occasion arises, make a
similar analysis and reach the same result.
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1. OBSCENITY IS SIMPLY NOT CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED, AND THE
STATE Is FREE TO DEAL ITH IT IN ANY MANNER.
In Roth v. United States,26 the Court declared that since obscenity
is worthless and "utterly without redeeming social importance,"
27
it is not protected by the first and fourteenth amendments. How-
ever, upon closer analysis, neither Roth nor any subsequent case
reached such a broad and absolute conclusion. Rather, Roth and its
progeny primarily centered upon the use of the mails or some other
form of public distribution, and the holdings therefore are limited
to defining the scope of state and federal regulations in such cir-
cumstances.
28
Roth did recognize, of course, a valid state interest in dealing
with problems of obscenity, but, as stated in Stanley: "[T]he
assertion of that interest cannot, in every context, be insulated from
all constitutional protections." 29 This recalls the warning in Roth:
[C]easeless vigilance is the watchword to prevent . . . erosion
[of first amendment rights] by Congress or by the States. The
door barring federal and state intrusion into this area cannot be
left ajar; it must be kept tightly closed and opened only the slight-
est crack necessary to prevent encroachment upon more important
interests.3 0
Most importantly, the Roth premise, that obscenity is not an
"essential part of any exposition of ideas,"'1 appears to have been
expressly overruled in Stanley.
Nor is it relevant that obscene materials in general, or the par-
ticular films before the Court, are arguably devoid of any ideological
content. The line between the transmission of ideas and mere
entertainment is much too elusive for this Court to draw, if indeed
such a line can be drawn at all.32
It therefore does not appear logical to reason that obscenity is
per se outside the scope of first amendment protection.
26 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
27 Id. at 484.
28 See Redrup v. New York, 386 U.S. 767 (1967); Mishkin v. New York,
383 U.S. 502 (1966); Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463 (1966);
Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184 (1964); Smith v. California, 361 U.S.
147 (1959); Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507 (1948); Hannegan v.
Esquire, Inc., 327 U.S. 146 (1946); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315
U.S. 568 (1942); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931); Hoke v. United
States, 227 U.S. 308 (1913); Public Clearing House v. Coyne, 194 U.S.
497 (1904); Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275 (1897); United States v.
Chase, 135 U.S. 255 (1890); Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727 (1877).
29 394 U.S. at 563.
30 354 U.S. at 488.
31 Id. at 484-85.
32 394 U.S. at 566.
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2. THE STATE MAY REPRESS OBSCENE EXPRESSION TO PROTECT MORAL
STANDARDS.
It has been argued that the real target of the censors is not
obscenity, but sin;33 yet if anything is protected by the first amend-
ment it is the freedom to choose individually what is virtuous and
moral. In Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents, 4 the Court found
that a film had been denied a license because it advocated adultery
as acceptable behavior. It reversed, holding that obscenity could
not be suppressed on ideological grounds.
In Stanley, the Court summarily rejects the validity of any gov-
ernmental interest in programmed morality. "Our whole constitu-
tional heritage rebels at the thought of giving government the
power to control men's minds.... [I]t is wholly inconsistent with
the philosophy of the First Amendment."3 5
Stanley clearly protects the right of the individual to "corrupt
and deprave" himself in the privacy of his home, and the lack of
extended discussion on privacy would seem to indicate that the
intrusion into Stanley's home only added insult to injury. Wherever
the cloak of "privacy" can be drawn, the first and fourteenth amend-
ments ward off the arm of the state and protect the reception of
obscene matter. The reception notion raises significant questions,
but in the Court's opinion it is clear that the right to "receive"
36
information and ideas regardless of their worth is fundamental to a
free society.
To control the moral contents of a person's thoughts may be a
noble idea to some, but it is wholly inconsistent with the guarantee
of the first amendment, and cannot legitimize governmental repres-
sion of obscenity.
33 Henkin, Morals and the Constitution: The Sin of Obscenity, 63 CoLumv.
L. REV. 391 (1963). If sin is the censors target, then the Establishment
Clause might also be an issue. It is interesting that cookbooks (glut-
tony) and get-rich-quick books (greed) escape the fires of damnation.
34 360 U.S. 684 (1959).
35 Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. at 565-66. Richard Kuh, well known for
his prosecution of obscenity cases in New York City, and his book,
Foolish Figleaves?, argues that the libertarians who protest against
censorship on the ground that morals may not be legislated, are the
same individuals who oppose segregation and the death penalty on
moral grounds. KUH, FOOLISH FIGLEAVES? 280-82 (1967). The writer
would suggest that it is unconstitutional force which is offensive.
Force is, of course, also a political and moral issue.
36 360 U.S. at 564. At this point "receive" is expressly used three times
by the Court.
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3. THE STATE MAY SUPPRESS OBSCENITY IN AN ATTEMPT TO CONTROL
DEVIANT SEXUAL BEHAVIOR OR CRIIES OF SEXUAL VIOLENCE.
This rationale for repression of obscenity, if valid, would tend
to fit within the general principle of the first amendment. 37 How-
ever, the argument fails to meet the state's burden of proof. The
Court in Stanley expressly stated that current evidence was insuffi-
cient, and that without emperical evidence the proposition could
not be upheld.38
Given the present state of knowledge, the State may no more
prohibit mere possession of obscene matter on the ground that it
may lead to antisocial conduct than it may prohibit possession
of chemistry books on the ground that they may lead to the manu-
facture of homemade spirits.39
Furthermore, the Stanley opinion recognizes that: "[A]mong free
men, the deterrents ordinarily to be applied to prevent crime are
education and punishment for violations of the law."
40
4. THE STATE MAY REGULATE IN THE INTEREST OF PREVENTING UN-
WILLING EXPOSURE TO OBSCENITY.
Few, if any, scholars and authorities have questioned the validity
of the state's interest in preventing obtrusive obscene expression.
The harm is clear and present; it cannot be prevented by subse-
quent sanction. The state may defend its citizens' right of privacy. 1
Such regulation would fall within general first amendment prin-
ciples, regulating the "how" and "where" of speech.4 2 This is the
last state interest which has been historically and traditionally
asserted as sufficient to counterbalance the first amendment.
43 It
may be the only legitimate state interest.
37 Professor Emerson would reject even this argument as repugnant to
the principle that illegal acts must be dealt with directly rather than
by suppression of expression. Emerson, note 11 supra, at 938.
38 394 U.S. at 566 & n.9. See, e.g., Cairns, Paul & Wishner, Sex Censorship:
The Assumptions of Anti-Obscenity Laws and the Empirical Evidence,
46 MINN. L. REV. 1009, 1034 (1962); Gerber, A Suggested Solution to
the Riddle of Obscenity, 112 U. PA. L. REV. 834, 850 & n.55; Henkin,
note 33 supra, at 393 & n.127; Lockhart & McClure, Censorship of
Obscenity: The Developing Constitutional Standards, 45 MXtNN. L. REV.
5 (1960); Morreale, note 25 supra, at 444-48 & nn.137-57.
39 394 U.S. at 567.
40 Id. at 566-67.
41 Cf. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
42 See Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949).
43 Obviously obtrusiveness was not an issue in Stanley. Thus, it was the
only interest not argued by Georgia, nor refuted and held invalid.
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III. THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE STANLEY RATIONALE
Until Stanley, the Court seemed content to decide by defining, a
process which invariably neglected placing any burden on the
state to show why its interest should supercede the guarantees of
the first and fourteenth amendments. Stanley would seem to ex-
clude such reasoning in the future.44 An analysis of Stanley con-
cludes that (1) obscenity is protected speech and is not per se out-
side the scope of constitutional protection; (2) the state has no
legitimate interest in controlling the moral contents of thought;
(3) there is not sufficient evidence to establish a causal relationship
between obscenity and antisocial or criminal behavior; and (4) the
only historical and traditional state interest in obscenity which has
not been invalidated by the Court is the regulation of obtrusive-
ness.45 Where does this analysis leave obscenity and the law?46
The only case to have considered Stanley at this time is Stein v.
Batchelor.47 There a three-judge district court held the Texas
obscenity statute unconstitutionally broad and enjoined enforce-
ment of the statute.4 8 In doing so, the district court had occasion to
consider the implications of the Stanley opinion, and reasoned:
[O]bscenity is deprived of ... protection only in the context of
'public actions taken or intended to be taken with respect to obscene
matter.' ... Stanley also indicates that in the context of 'private'
expression there is unlikely to be any legitimate state interest
justifying regulation (with the possible exception of the State's
interest in protecting children.) 49
The question is now what is "public action" and what is "private
expression" in the light of a Stanley analysis which leaves obtru-
siveness the only legitimate state interest.
44 The argument would run, as in Stanley, that this is obscene, but is
there any valid state interest which can transcend the guarantees of
the first and fourteenth amendments?
45 This note does not consider the status of the "pandering test" after
Stanley. Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463 (1966). But, after
Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413 (1966), and Mishkin v. New
York, 383 U.S. 502 (1966), it can be argued that only Mr. Justice Clark
puts any decisive merit in its application. He has been replaced by
Mr. Justice Marshall who wrote the majority opinion in Stanley.
48 The writer of this note must again refer the reader to the article of
Mr. Morreale, note 25 supra. Mr. Morreale's analysis seems most
accurate in light of Stanley, and his statutory proposal a valid and
reasonable approach to obscenity under our Constitution.
47 300 F. Supp. 602 (N.D. Tex. 1969).
48 TEx. PEm. CODE AN. art. 527, §§ 1 to 3 (1952).
49 300 F. Supp. at 606-07 (emphasis added).
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The writer believes that a wise and preferable rationale would
lead to the conclusion that protection against unwilling exposure
to or confrontation with obscenity are the only clearly valid state
interests in repressing obscenity among adults. It would seem incon-
gruous to say that a person may use and possess obscenity as a con-
stitutional right, yet the state may make such use and possession
impossible by prohibiting the movement of vehicles of such pro-
tected sensory perception. One can hardly get the message if there
is not a medium.50 Such a future may be forecast in Stanley when
the court says:
It is now well established that the Constitution protects the right
to receive information and ideas. 'This freedom [of speech and
press] necessarily protects the right to receive. . . .' This right to
receive information and ideas, regardless of their social worth,...
is fundamental to our free society.51
IV. CONCLUSION
Only the court can determine the future of the Stanley rationale,
if indeed there is one beneath the narrow holding. It would seem
that obscenity has been recognized as within the general principle
of the first amendment, and that of the hiistorical and traditional
state interests which have been advanced to legitimize repression
of obscenity, only obtrusiveness remains tenable after Stanley. But,
whatever is recognized in the future as a legitimate state interest,
50 "The most controversial consequences of this approach are that book-
sellers would be able to sell hard core pornographic books and pictures
to willing adults, and stag movies could be shown at the local theatre.
However, neither a book displayed in the bookshop window nor the
theatre billboards could portray anything nearly as pornographic. A
more general and far-reaching implication may be that it questions
the validity of all morals legislation, even in areas outside of the first
amendment, for which it is difficult to articulate a rational, utilitarian
purpose." Morreale, note 25 supra.
51 Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. at 564 (emphasis added). See Karalexis
v. Byrne, 38 U.S.L.W. 1090 (D. Mass. Nov. 28, 1969), motion for stay
of temporary injunction granted, 38 U.S.L.W. 3221 (D. Mass. Dec. 15,
1969). A three judge federal court for the District of Massachusetts
held that Stanley protected a commercial showing of a concededly
obscene movie. The district court's language should be of particular
interest. "[W]e think it probable that Roth remains intact only with
respect to public distribution in the full sense, and that restricted
distribution adequately controlled is no longer to be condemned ....
A constitutional right to receive a communication would seem mean-
ingless if there were no coextensive right to make it. If a rich Stanley
can view a film, or read a book in his home, a poorer Stanley should
be free to visit a protected theater or library." 38 U.S.L.W. at 2328
(citations omitted).
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the next case will be harder. Intuitive and definitional recognition
of obscenity 52 does not put an end to the issue. The Court has indi-
cated its intention to discern why the state's interest should be
allowed to pierce first amendment protection, and it can no longer
be said of the court that:
I have no other but a woman's reason;
I think him so, because I think him so.
53
John R. Snowden '71
52 Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1963) (Stewart, J., concurring),
'q know it when I see it. .. ."
53 "Two Gentlemen of Verona" (Act I, sc. ii).
